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POLLUTION CONTROL IN ILLINOIS-THE ROLE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Thomas J. Immel*
The litmus test of the regulatory scheme for environmental control lies
in its enforcement procedures. Mr. Immel, based on his personal experi-
ence in the office of the Illinois Attorney General, presents an overview of
the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, and offers a reply to the criti-
cisms made by Mr. Steven Klein regarding possible conflicts of interest and
the role of the Illinois Attorney General in the enforcement of the EPA.
N 1968 there were no funds in the budget of the Illinois At-
torney General specifically allocated to pollution control activ-
ity. The Environmental Protection Act was only an idea in
the minds of a few interested citizens. The now extinct Sanitary
Water and Air Pollution Control Boards had promulgated many
standards, all too often accompanied by rather tentative compliance
deadlines; but the Boards only infrequently sought to enforce their
rules and regulations through court action brought by the Attorney
General on their behalf. In short, a readily cognizable, credible
and uniform state-wide program to enforce anti-pollution laws did
not exist. Then, rather suddenly, everything changed.
During an eighteen month period commencing in January of
1969, a concatenation of events transpired which had the effect of
transforming the Illinois environmental program root and branch.
In order of appearance they were: resuscitation of the infrequently
employed "common law nuisance" theory by the newly elected At-
torney General and its application to environmental litigation; pas-
sage of legislation in mid-1969 giving the Attorney General specific
authority to move against polluters by injunction;' and, passage of
the Environmental Protection Act in July of 1970.2 Discussion of
these developments with particular emphasis on the constitutional
and statutory duties of the Attorney General is the purpose of this
article.
* Partner, Burditt & Calkins, Chicago, Illinois.
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 14, §§ 11 and 12 (1971).
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , §§ 1001 etseq. (1971).
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COMMON LAW NUISANCE
At a time when public outcry against environmental degradation
was reaching its highest pitch, the Illinois Attorney General' had
recently been elected after successfully campaigning on a platform
which included a strong anti-pollution plank. Confronted with a
complete dearth of effective environmental laws and neither the
budget nor the staff to conduct environmental litigation, he was
hardly in a position to carry through his stated intentions. Neverthe-
less, some semblance of an Environmental Control Division was
mustered by reassignment of existing staff. Budget problems were
alleviated at the start of a new fiscal year in July, 1969. Legislation
was introduced in the General Assembly to specify the powers of
the Attorney General with respect -to the environment.4 In the
meantime, a decision was made to mount an aging and slightly
dilapidated horse-the "common law nuisance" theory.
Illinois courts have long recognized and exercised their power
to order abatement of "public" or "common" nuisances. 5  It has
never been altogether clear to this writer at what point the demarca-
tion between "private"' and "public" nuisance is breached. It has
been relatively simple for the courts to conclude, for example, that
the emission of foul odors in sufficient quantity to inundate an entire
neighborhood is a "public" nuisance.0 On the other hand, if the
same conduct affects only one person or a "very small portion of
a neighborhood," the courts may and have concluded that the nui-
sance is "private."' The distinction, though not the most readily
drawn, can be important because generally the Illinois courts only
recognize the right of the Attorney General or State's Attorney to
seek abatement of "public" nuisances.8 Fortunately, in the very
early stages of the Attorney General's "common law" or "public"
nuisance litigation, it was not necessary to deal with this potentially
difficult problem. The first filings inevitably involved entire neigh-
3. William J. Scott.
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 14, §§ 11 and 12 (1971).
5. See, e.g., Edelman Bros. v. Baikoff, 277 Ill. App. 432 (1934).
6. City of Chicago v. Fritz, 36 Ill. App. 2d 457, 184 N.E.2d 713 (1962).
7. See Edelman Bros. v. Baikoff, 277 I11. App. 432 (1934); Wylie v. Elwood,
34 I11. App. 244, aa'd, 134 I11. 281, 25 N.E. 570 (1889).
8. People ex rel. Thrasher v. Smith, 275 I11. 256, 114 N.E. 31 (1916); Stead
v. Fortner, 171 Il. App. 161, ajj'd, 255 Ill. 468, 99 N.E. 680 (1912).
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borhoods or communities of complaining citizens and could be de-
scribed as "public" nuisance cases of very classical proportions.
The public nuisance theory as applied to pollution litigation has
certain limitations. Historically, the courts have exercised their
equity jurisdiction only in those instances where the damage to the
public health, safety or comfort caused by the alleged nuisance was
absolutely manifest. Thus, it has been held that covering a neigh-
borhood with coal dust,9 storing dead animals in a residential area,10
maintaining a fire hazard1 or emitting gross and obnoxious odors' 2
constitutes a "public" or "common law" nuisance. On the other
hand, no court has yet held that discharging a liquid effluent con-
taining 0.9 milligrams per liter of dissolved iron into a receiving
stream constitutes a "public" nuisance in light of the present state
regulation limiting such a discharge to 0.5 milligrams per liter.'8
Such a ruling is quite unlikely.
Since it was apparent from the outset that the "common law"
nuisance action would have necessarily limited application in the
Attorney General's anti-pollution activity, it was deemed necessary
to seek specific legislative authority to enjoin polluting, though not
necessarily "nuisance," discharges of contaminants.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ACT
The 76th Illinois General Assembly amended "An Act in regard
to attorneys general and state's attorneys"' 4 by enacting, effective
July 1, 1969, "An Act in relation to the prevention and abatement
of air, land and water pollution."15  This new legislation was subse-
quently amended 6 to conform with the Environmental Protection
Act.' 7 After defining the terms "air," "water" and "land pollution,"8
9. Wylie v. Elwood, 34 Ill. App. 244, aff'd, 134 Ill. 281, 25 N.E. 570 (1889).
10. Seacord v. People, 121 Ill. 623, 13 N.E. 194 (1887).
11. Rohrbach v. Cavallini, 210 Ill. App. 182 (1918).
12. City of Chicago v. Fritz, 36 111. App. 2d 457, 184 N.E.2d 713 (1962).
13. State of Illinois Pollution Control Board Regulations, ch. 3 (Water Pollution
-Effluent Standards), Rule 408(a) (1973).
14. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 14, H9 1 et seq. (1971).
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 14, §§ 11 and 12 (1971).
16. Amended by P.A. 76-2434 (eff. July 1, 1970); codified in ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 14, H9 11 and 12 (1971).
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , § 1001 et seq. (1971).
18. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 14, § 11 (1971).
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the Act now provides, in pertinent part:
The Attorney General has the power and authority, notwithstanding and
regardless of any proceeding instituted or to be instituted by or before the
Environmental Protection Agency, Pollution Control Board or any other
administrative agency, to prevent air, land or water pollution within this
state by commencing an action or proceeding in the circuit court or any
county in which such pollution has been, or is about to be, caused or has
occurred, in order to have such pollution stopped or prevented either by
mandamus or injunction. . . .19
Under the aegis of this statue, complaints were filed against four
major steel companies which discharged their effluent directly or
indirectly into Lake Michigan. The most widely publicized of the
four, a suit against the South Side Works of United States Steel,20
was conducted in cooperation with the Metropolitan Sanitary Dis-
trict. After protracted pre-trial discovery and negotiation, the com-
pany agreed to construct a $12,000,000 "closed loop" whereby their
multi-million gallons per day discharge into Lake Michigan would
be terminated and, instead, completely recycled. The same result
was obtained in suits against Republic2' and Interlake Steel.22 The
fourth case is still pending. These are but a minute sample of
the many suits filed under the Attorney General's Act. Between
July 1, 1969, and July 1, 1970, this was the only sort of anti-pollu-
tion suit being filed on behalf of the state or its agencies. The
Attorney General was quite simply the only game in town.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT
The next major development in the Illinois environmental pro-
gram came with the passage of "An Act to protect the environment
of the State and to repeal certain Acts therein named," otherwise
known as the Environmental Protection Act.2" A full discussion
of the Act's various provisions and the changes they wrought would
take us well beyond the scope of this article. It suffices for that
purpose to remember that in instances of possible violation of the
19. id. § 12.
20. People ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 69 CH 3334 (Cir. Ct. Cook
County, filed Sept. 18, 1969).
21. People ex rel. Scott v. Republic Steel Corp., 69 CH 3675 (Cir. Ct. Cook
County, filed Oct. 14, 1969).
22. People ex rel. Scott v. Interlake Steel, Inc., 70 CH 937 (Cir. Ct. Cook
County, filed March 7, 1970).
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, §§ 1001 et seq. (1971).
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Act or regulations in effect pursuant thereto, it is the function of
the Environmental Protection Agency to initiate enforcement action
and the function of the Pollution Control Board to adjudicate such
claims. The Attorney General's duty with respect to these two state
agencies and his role in the enforcement process itself is clearly
delineated in the Illinois Constitution, the Attorney General's and
State's Attorneys' Act and in numerous decisions of the Supreme
Court of Illinois.
The Constitution of Illinois states that: "The Attorney General
shall be the legal officer of the State, and shall have the duties
and powers that may be prescribed by law."24  The Constitution
of 1870 had even less to say about the matter, simply stating the ex-
istence of the office of the Attorney General and mandating per-
formance of such duties "as may be prescribed by law."'25
The language of the 1870 Constitution concerning the office of
Attorney General is discussed at some length in Fergus v. Russel."
The Illinois Supreme Court there held unconstitutional an appro-
priation to the State Insurance Superintendent for legal services of
independent counsel, for traveling expenses of attorneys and court
costs in prosecution of violations of the insurance laws:
By our constitution we created this office by the common law designation
of Attorney General and thus impressed it with all its common law powers
and duties. As the office of Attorney General is the only office at com-
mon law which is thus created by our constitution the Attorney General
is the chief law officer of the State, and the only officer empowered to
represent the people in any suit or proceeding in which the State is the
real party in interest, except where the Constitution or a constitutional
statute may provide otherwise. With this exception, only, he is the sole
official adviser of the executive officers and of all boards, commissions,
and departments of the State government, and it is his duty to conduct
the law business of the State, both in and out of the courts. The appro-
priation to the Insurance Superintendent for legal services and for traveling
expenses of attorneys and court costs in prosecutions for violations of in-
surance laws is unconstitutional and void.27
A "constitutional statute" which provides "otherwise" is section
6(e) of the Toll Highway Act of 1953 .28 This section gives the
Toll Highway Commission the power to
24. ILL. CONST., art. V, § 15.
25. ILL. CONST., art. V, § 15 (1870).
26. 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915).
27. Id. at 342, 110 N.E. at 145 (emphasis added).
28. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121, § 314a31 (1971).
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retain special counsel, subject to the approval of the Attorney General,
as needed from time to time, and fix their compensation, provided how-
ever, such special counsel shall be subject to the control, direction and su-
pervision of the Attorney General and shall serve at his pleasure.
29
Faced with the argument that this statutory provision violated Fer-
gus v. Russel, the supreme court admitted that a literal reading
might render the statute susceptible to such a conclusion, but ul-
timately concluded:
The proper construction of the act is that the commission, from the
funds available to it, allocates so much money as is necessary to pay for
necessary legal services. The function of the commission in making funds
available for special counsel and attorneys is analogous to the function of
the legislature in appropriating moneys to the Attorney General from the
general revenues of the State. By the amount it appropriates and by the
limitations of salary rates, the legislature, too, in a sense controls the ap-
pointment and the compensation of assistant Attorneys General. It is
only in this sense that the commission can be said to appoint or fix com-
pensation of special counsel or assistant attorneys. In harmony with our
earlier holdings, the legislature intended that these special counsel and as-
sistant attorneys be as a much a part of the staff of the Attorney General
and subject to his control in all respects as are those assistants paid from
the funds appropriated directly to him by the General Assembly. Even
though attorneys and special counsel for the commission may perform
legal services for the State, their right to do so exists only because they
are subordinates of the Attorney General.
Moreover, neither section I of article V nor any other provision of the
constitution inhibits the expenditure of revenue derived from highway tolls
for the purpose of defraying the legal expenses incident to the construc-
tion, maintenance and operation of the toll highway system. Such legal
expense may validily include the compensation of assistant attorneys or
special counsel utilized by the Attorney General in discharging his duty
as attorney for the commission. Under the provisions of the statute here
considered, the Attorney General is fully recognized as the attorney and
legal adviser of the commission and the assistant attorneys of special
counsel are completely subordinate to him. By proper construction of
these subsections we conclude they do not contravene section I of article
V of the constitution. These provisions are a valid method of enabling
the Attorney General to perform his legal functions as attorney for the
commission in a manner harmonious with the overall design of the act
that the cost of the toll highways, including legal expenses, be borne from
revenue derived from the tolls collected for their use.3 0
This decision is the only inroad into the Fergus v. Russel doctrine
acknowledged to be such by the Illinois Supreme Court."'
29. Id.
30. People v. Illinois Toll Highway Comm'n, 3 Ill. 2d 218, 237-38, 120 N.E.2d
35, 45-46 (1954).
31. See Stein v. Howlett, 52 IIl. 2d 570, 586, 289 N.E.2d 409, 418 (1972) where
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Whether the Illinois Constitution of 1970 has changed the rule
of Fergus v. Russel was discussed in Stein v. Howlett:
The proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1970 seem to indi-
cate a clear intent to preserve the policy of Fergus v. Russell in this re-
spect. In Braden & Cohn, The Illinois Constitution: An Annotated and
Comparative Analysis (1969), it was pointed out that the result in that
case was based on an interpretation of section 1 of article V of the consti-
tution of 1870, which provided that the Attorney General "shall perform
such duties as may be prescribed by law." It was suggested that the way
to change the rule of Fergus v. Russell was to rephrase the provision (Bra-
den & Cohn, p. 260). No change was made by the Convention, however,
and the present constitution contains the identical language that was be-
fore the court in Fergus v. Russell.3 2
Numerous other decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court have held
that the Attorney General is exclusively the attorney for all state
officers and agencies and is charged with the responsibility of con-
ducting their law business both in and out of court.8 3
ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE ACT
It is obvious that the duty of the Attorney General is to act as
legal counsel to both the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
and its Director. Further, it is his duty to represent the Agency
in any litigation in which it is a party.
In spite of the overwhelming precedent which clearly required
this attorney-client relationship, the persons responsible for shaping
the newly created Illinois Environmental Protection Agency chose
instead to establish an independent "Bureau of Legal Services"
within the Agency which was promptly staffed with several attor-
neys. They, in turn, commenced to file lawsuits on behalf of the
state. The patent illegality of this arrangement brought about its
the court said:
In People v. Illinois Toll Highway Corn., 3 Ill. 2d 218, 236 (1954), this court
held that the provision of the Toll Highway Act which authorized the commis-
sion to employ counsel was not invalid in that such appointments would be
subject to the control, direction and supervision of the Attorney General and
the appointees would serve only at his pleasure. Even though this decision
marked a deviation from the rigidity of prior decisions on this issue, Fergus
v. Russel was cited as authority for this holding.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Bakalis, 54 Ill. 2d 448, 299 N.E.2d 737 (1973);
People ex rel. Elliott v. Covelli, 415 Ill. 79, 112 N.E.2d 156 (1953); Barrett v.
Finnegan, 378 Ill. 387, 38 N.E.2d 715 (1941); Saxby v. Sonnemann, 318 Ill. 600,
149 N.E. 526 (1925).
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demise in rather short order, and by March of 1971, all enforcement
matters brought by the Agency were being handled through the
office of the Attorney General, just as the law clearly dictates. It
was legally impossible for the Agency to prosecute through inde-
pendent counsel. Notwithstanding this, at least one author is still
mourning the extirpation of the practice.
In a recent article published in this journal,34 Mr. Steven Klein
discoursed at some length on the duties and activities of the agencies
created by the Environmental Protection Act. He cites the "in-
volvement of the Attorney General's Office" in enforcement func-
tions as a major problem in the environmental protection program.35
However, Mr. Klein bases his conclusion on purported facts and state-
ments of law which merit opposing comment.
Mr. Klein assumes that the Attorney General has a principal role
in directing the enforcement policies of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency: "It is the Attorney General who decides whether a
case should or should not be filed, be given high priority or low,
settled or contested." 6 In point of fact, it is the Director of the
EPA who makes those decisions, as he properly should. His tech-
nical personnel conduct the field investigations which unearth the
facts. Those same people determine whether a violation of the Act
has occurred. Priority lists for enforcement action are developed
within the EPA under the Director's supervision. When and if a
decision to prosecute is made, it is made by the EPA Director. An
affirmative decision by the Director will result in a case being re-
ferred to the office of the Attorney General where a very narrow
area of concern is explored: to wit, is the evidence contained in
the file legally sufficient to prove the alleged violation? If it is,
a complaint is filed forthwith; if it is not, additional information is
requested. Never has the Attorney General declined to prosecute
because he differed with the Director's policy decision. To the
extent that he has any policies of his own he is free to implement
them under the aegis of his own statutory powers.37  He does not
34. Klein, Pollution Control In Illinois-The Formative Years, 22 DEPAUL L.
REV. 759 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Klein].
35. Id. at 772.
36. Id.
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 14, §§ 11 and 12 (1971).
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exercise any latitude with respect to the policy prerogatives of the
Agency's Director.
As in any sort of lawsuit, it is not uncommon for the respondent
to an EPA enforcement complaint to at least inquire about possible
settlement. These inquiries are inevitably directed to the office of
the Attorney General and in turn to the EPA. If the Agency is
amenable to a negotiated settlement, the respondent is so advised
by the Attorney General and meetings for that purpose are ar-
ranged. Agency representatives are present at all such meetings.
Offers of settlement are not submitted to the Pollution Control
Board without the written approval of the Agency Director. Thus,
the Attorney General has no role in the policy decision to settle
or litigate. His function is simply to assess the relative strengths
and weaknesses of any given enforcement case and advise his client.
The ultimate decision, to settle or contest, is left to the Agency.
Mr. Klein is, of course, free to opine that the EPA ought to con-
duct its law business through independent counsel. Although there
is no evidence to suggest that the policy making and legal counsel
roles are so inextricably woven together as to place the Attorney
General in charge of every state agency he represents, Mr. Klein
might persuasively argue for a change in the law if such evidence
could be found. By the same token, he is without license to: (a)
assume the existence of all critical facts which might support his
thesis, and (b) conclude his faux pas with an unabashed assertion
that the Attorney General's representation of the Agency "was cer-
tainly not envisioned by the Environmental Protection Act. The
statute empowered the Environmental Protection Agency to prose-
cute its own cases before the Pollution Control Board."' 8
Mr. Klein also entertains the theory that the Attorney General's
representation of the Agency in enforcement proceedings amounts
to a conflict of interest. In support of this notion he has launched
a flotilla of rather bizarre examples. For instance:
Respondent polluter and Attorney General, acting on behalf of EPA, agree
to a settlement proposal, calling on respondent to pay a nominal penalty,
and install barely adequate control devices within an extended period of
time. The proposal is submitted to the Board, and is correctly rejected.
Respondent appeals, and the Board has to be represented in the appellate
court by the Attorney General, who has already gone on record supporting
the settlement proposal. 3 9
38. Klein at 773.
39. Id.
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Mr. Klein asserts that this situation actually arose in EPA v. Pack-
aging Corporation of America.40  Viewed in the abstract, the ex-
ample flounders due to the fact that rejection of an offer of settle-
ment is not a final order from which any party to Board proceedings
can take an administrative review. The supposed conflict of inter-
est of the Attorney General cannot, therefore, occur.
The Packaging Corporation case involved a proposed settlement
by which the respondent offered to install water pollution control
equipment to bring its discharge into compliance with state stand-
ards and pay a penalty of $3,000. This settlement proposal was
offered to the Pollution Control Board with the express approval
of the EPA Director. It was rejected by the Board on the sole
ground that the stipulated penalty was undersized. The char-
acterization of the control equipment as "barely adequate" is Mr.
Klein's, not the Board's. Packaging did not seek administrative re-
view, as Mr. Klein asserts, because, as pointed out above, they could
not. Instead, protracted litigation occurred which resulted in the
Board imposing a $10,000 fine. In the final analysis, the Board
struck a bad bargain in rejecting the offer of settlement. First of
all, a year of litigation intervened between rejection of the settle-
ment and a final order, during which time no control equipment
was installed. Second, the $7,000 increase in penalty was more
than consumed in litigation costs which benefited no one except
respondent's attorneys. Third, the company was sold prior to the
Board's final order so that no abatement program could be ordered.
Indeed, the only abatement of pollution caused by the facility in
question was brought about by litigation in the circuit court between
the Attorney General and the facility's new owner. By consent de-
cree the new owner has agreed to completely recycle all wastes
from the plant, achieving a "zero discharge. '"41
Mr. Klein offers still another example:
The Attorney General, as attorney for the complainant (EPA) represents
a client (EPA) before another client (the Board), whom he must also
represent if an appeal should be taken from the Board's decision. A clear
conflict of interest has arisen. 4 2
40. 5 State of Illinois Pollution Control Board Opinions, No. 72-10; interim or-
der entered Aug. 8, 1972; final order entered Dec. 7, 1973.
41. People ex rel. Scott v. Celotex Corp., 72 CH 14 (Cir. Ct. Adams County,
filed Aug. 25, 1972).
42. Klein at 773.
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By any rational analysis, this so-called conflict is anything but
"clear," based as it is on a false premise. The Pollution Control
Board is certainly not the "client" of the Attorney General in the
context of an enforcement proceeding or an administrative review
taken therefrom, nor is the Board a "party" to any of those proceed-
ings. The client is the real party in interest-the Environmental
Protection Agency whose complaint is presented by the Attorney
General. If the complaint is successfully presented, resulting in ad-
ministrative review at the behest of the unhappy respondent, the
Attorney General continues to represent the Agency, seeking to re-
tain that which was won before the Board. Similarly, if the Attor-
ney General is unsuccessful in his case before the Board, and, the
Environmental Protection Agency asks for administrative review,
the respondent will then bear the burden of defending the Board's
action in his favor. In either event, the Board is the "client" of
no one, nor is it a party any more than a judge of the circuit court
is a party to every appeal taken from an order he enters.
It should be remembered that under the Act the Pollution Control
Board wears both adjudicatory and regulatory hats. Persons ad-
versely affected or threatened by a Board regulation may seek ad-
ministrative review." In those instances, and only in those in-
stances, does the Attorney General represent the Board as a "client."
The Agency is not a party to such a proceeding-the Board is.
However, when donning its adjudicatory hat and taking evidence
on an EPA enforcement complaint, the Board necessarily loses its
"party" status. If that were not the case the Board's standing as
an impartial tribunal would be totally undermined and serious ques-
tions could be raised about the propriety of the entire enforcement
process.
Still straining to support the conflict of interest theory, Mr. Klein
makes one last effort:
EPA prepares a case against a major polluter, turns it over to Attorney
General's office for prosecution. Attorney General refuses to file, due to
sensitivity of subject, issue, or some other political or personal considera-
tion; not to mention delays involved in the actual presentation of cases
which all agree should 'be filed.4 4
43. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1112, § 1029 (1971).
44. Klein at 773.
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Since no example of this "conflict" is cited as having ever occurred
and this writer is unaware of any such circumstance having come
to pass, it would appear that the "conflict" is merely hypothetical.
The overall thrust of Klein's article is that prosecution of EPA
cases by the Attorney General has been inadequate. Meanwhile,
public records of the Pollution Control Board indicate that several
hundred enforcement cases have been litigated to conclusion by the
Attorney General. An enormous number of pollution abatement
projects have been commenced as a result of all this activity, not
to mention over one million dollars in penalties assessed by the
Board to date. It appears from the record that Mr. Klein's thesis is
invalid.
OTHER REMEDIES
Beyond the duty to represent the Environmental Protection
Agency in its enforcement matters, the Attorney General is cloaked
with other duties by the Environmental Protection Act.
Section 42 of the Act permits the Attorney General to inde-
pendently enter the civil courts and seek injunctive relief against
violations of the Act, Board regulations or Board orders. 45  This
modus operandi is an alternative to filing an enforcement complaint
before the Board, and complements the powers vested in the Attor-
ney General under his own Act.4 Interestingly, the terms of sec-
tion 42 preclude the Pollution Control Board from hearing a com-
plaint which alleges violation of a prior Board order. Jurisdiction
over such claims is vested exclusively in the circuit courts.
Section 43 of the Act supplements the injunctive remedy provided
by section 42 insofar as it permits emergency ex parte injunctions
"[i]n circumstances of substantial danger to the environment or to
the public health. . . or. . .welfare of persons where such danger
is to the livelihood of such persons."47  Again, it is the function
of the Attorney General to bring such actions.
In addition to all other remedies, section 44 of the Act4" declares
any violation of the Act or regulations thereunder to be a mis-
45. P.A. 78-862, § 42 (Sept. 14, 1973).
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 14, §§ 11 and 12 (1971).
47. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/, § 1043 (1971).
48, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , § 1044 (1971).
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demeanor. Here, either the Attorney General or the State's Attor-
ney of the appropriate county is authorized to file an information
and proceed as in any criminal case. Obviously, the drafters of
the Environmental Protection Act recognized that there is more
than one way to skin a cat.
CONCLUSION
The complete restructuring of the Illinois environmental program,
which took place in a relatively short time frame, has given Illinois
the opportunity to become the cleanest industrial state in the nation.
Further, the program's unique array of available legal remedies has
allowed governmental agencies to muster more weapons in the
fight against environmental degradation than their counterparts in
other jurisdictions.
Since January of 1969, virtually every major uncontrolled source
of pollution in Illinois has been identified and given some degree
of administrative or judicial attention. Much still needs to be done.
Activity at the federal level will undoubtedly necessitate additional
alterations in the Illinois program. Changes in the availability of
funding or control technology may require us to reexamine our time-
tables. Further experience with this young judicial and administrative
scheme may teach us that other changes are required. But the
modifications of the future will be mere "fine tuning" compared
with the massive 180 degree turn of the last five years.
The people of Illinois are clearly committed to improvement in
the quality of their environment. The course is charted.
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